feat(claude-config): give audit-pass an executable for the run state it specified - #2441

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Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 3m 9s —— View job

Security review

• Gather context (diff, changed files)
• Review run-state.sh for injection/path-traversal/logic issues
• Review run-state.test.sh for unsafe patterns
• Review doc/reference changes for security-relevant claims
• Post findings

This PR is entirely shell scripts and Markdown (no GitHub Actions workflow changes, so the zizmor-covered lanes — unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, excessive permissions:, template injection — don't apply here).

Scope reviewed: plugins/claude-config/skills/audit-pass/scripts/run-state.sh (new), run-state.test.sh (new), and the SKILL.md / reference-doc diffs that describe how the script is invoked.

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — --run-dir is trusted wholesale by lease * / partial append, unlike paths

cmd_paths (run-state.sh:173-228) carefully validates both path segments it derives — --run-id through validate_run_id (run-state.sh:121-133) and --plugin-data for being absolute — before assembling run_dir. But lease acquire/heartbeat/release/classify and partial append (run-state.sh:230-503) all take --run-dir as a raw, pre-built string and never check that it actually falls under <plugin-data>/runs/<state-key>/…. cmd_lease_acquire will happily mkdir -p and write a lease file, and cmd_partial_append will write findings.partial.N.jsonl, at any path handed to --run-dir.

The PR's own "Trust surface" section states the script "writes only under the plugin data directory it is given... and never inside a target repository," and SKILL.md/reference docs instruct the model to always pipe paths' derived run_dir into the later commands (plugins/claude-config/skills/audit-pass/SKILL.md diff, "Do not derive the run directory or hand-write the lease"). That ordering is enforced by prose/model discipline only — nothing in the script itself re-validates that a --run-dir passed to lease/partial actually originated from paths. For a report-only audit skill whose entire premise is scanning potentially adversarial/untrusted repository content with Bash and Write still available, that's exactly the kind of boundary a confused-deputy or prompt-injection scenario could exploit: content in the audited repo that manages to alter the model's next tool call could redirect --run-dir (e.g., into the target repo being audited, or elsewhere under the user's filesystem) and the script would silently mkdir -p/write there — contradicting the explicit "never inside a target repository" guarantee.

Impact is limited (directory creation plus small, fixed-name text files — no code execution, no credential exposure), so this isn't critical, but it's a real gap between the stated trust boundary and what the code mechanically enforces, in a script whose whole purpose (per its own header) is turning previously-prose guarantees into enforced mechanism.

Suggested fix: have lease acquire/heartbeat/release/classify/partial append verify --run-dir is lexically under a --plugin-data-rooted runs/ prefix (or accept --plugin-data+--run-id+--root directly and re-derive the path internally via cmd_paths's own logic) rather than trusting a caller-supplied path verbatim.

Fix this →

No other issues found

• validate_run_id (run-state.sh:121-133) correctly rejects empty ids, non-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]* shapes, and any .. substring, with negative tests in run-state.test.sh proving each check is load-bearing (deleting either arm demonstrably lets traversal through). This closes the path-traversal surface for the one input the script treats as untrusted-by-design.
• No eval, source, command substitution over unsanitized input, or other injection surface — all arguments are consumed as literal argv values ($2, etc.) and never re-interpreted by the shell.
• --record for partial append is written with printf '%s\n' "$record" >>"$file" — a plain append, not parsed or evaluated by this script, so a malformed/adversarial JSON-shaped string can't do more than corrupt the JSONL artifact's own readability (a data-integrity concern for a downstream reader, not a code-execution or traversal vector here).
• write_lease_atomic's temp file uses a PID-based name ($dir/.lease.$$) under a directory the script itself creates; this only matters as a symlink race if an attacker already has write access to the same user's plugin-data directory, which is the same trust level as the process itself — not a meaningful privilege boundary, so not flagged as a finding.
• epoch/stale_after/skew_grace are all validated as non-negative integers (require_positive_int) before being written into the lease or used to build the partial's filename — no injection via those fields.
• No secrets, tokens, or credentials are handled anywhere in this diff.

Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 3m 2s —— View job

Security review

• Gather context (diff, changed files)
• Review run-state.sh for injection/path-traversal/logic/trust-boundary issues
• Review run-state.test.sh for unsafe patterns
• Review doc/reference changes for security-relevant claims
• Cross-check existing bot findings (Cursor/Codex) for accuracy
• Post findings

Scope reviewed: plugins/claude-config/skills/audit-pass/scripts/run-state.sh (new, 557 lines), run-state.test.sh (new), and the SKILL.md / reference/*.md diffs describing how the script is invoked. No workflow/Action files changed, so zizmor's lanes (unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, excessive permissions:, template injection) don't apply. Confirmed the code is unchanged since the prior automated pass on this PR (commit afc3486 only fixed a comment typo, no logic change).

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — --run-dir is trusted verbatim by lease * / partial append, unlike paths

cmd_paths validates both segments it derives — --run-id via validate_run_id, --plugin-data for being absolute — before assembling run_dir. But cmd_lease_acquire, heartbeat/release/classify, and cmd_partial_append all take --run-dir as a raw string and never check it falls under <plugin-data>/runs/<state-key>/…. lease acquire will mkdir -p and write a lease file at any --run-dir handed to it (confirmed by reading line 272, no containment check precedes the mkdir -p).

The PR's own "Trust surface" section and the new SKILL.md/reference prose (SKILL.md diff) state the script "writes only under the plugin data directory it is given... and never inside a target repository," but that ordering (always pipe paths' derived run_dir into later commands) is enforced by prompt/model discipline only. For a report-only skill whose whole premise is scanning potentially adversarial repository content with Bash/Write still available, this is a real gap between the stated trust boundary and what the code mechanically enforces: content that manages to influence the model's next tool call could redirect --run-dir and the script would silently mkdir -p/write there. Impact is limited (directory creation + small fixed-name text files, no code execution), so not critical — but it's the same class of "contract in prose, not mechanism" defect this PR's own stated purpose is to close for the rest of the run-state contract.

Suggested fix: have lease */partial append verify --run-dir is lexically under a --plugin-data-rooted runs/ prefix (or take --plugin-data+--run-id and re-derive the path via cmd_paths's own logic) before mkdir -p or writing.

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — lease acquire has no liveness/compare-and-set check, and partial append binds to whatever epoch is currently on disk, not the epoch the caller holds

cmd_lease_acquire never reads or classifies an existing lease before overwriting it — it unconditionally mkdir -ps and calls write_lease_atomic, silently replacing a lease even if classify on it would currently return live. Meanwhile cmd_partial_append re-reads owner_epoch from the lease file at append time rather than pinning to the epoch the caller originally acquired:

epoch=$(lease_field "$run_dir/lease" owner_epoch)
...
file="$run_dir/findings.partial.$epoch.jsonl"

So if a second lease acquire is ever issued against a run directory whose lease is still live (a genuinely concurrent run, a run-id collision, or a --resume flow that skips the classify-before-acquire check the script doesn't enforce — the same "prose orders the calls, code doesn't" gap as the finding above), the second writer's owner_epoch silently becomes the new value in the lease, and any prior holder still calling partial append will have its records appended to the new writer's partial file instead of its own — because the epoch is read live from disk, not carried by the caller. This directly undermines the isolation guarantee the PR describes for epoch-scoped partials ("the partial cannot exist without the lease that classifies it") by letting two writers' records interleave in one JSONL file without error. This overlaps with, and I can independently confirm, Codex's P1 comment on line 496 — the root cause is that acquire performs no compare-and-set against an existing live lease, which the append behavior then compounds.

Exploitability under the documented call pattern (single acquire → heartbeat/append → release per run) is narrow — it requires either a duplicate/colliding run-id or an out-of-order tool call, not something the normal happy path triggers, and stale-lease adoption is explicitly declared out of scope for this PR. Flagging because the script enforces the two-sided liveness read carefully (the classify negative tests are solid) but the write side of the same mutual-exclusion problem has no equivalent guard, so the isolation property is only as strong as caller discipline, not the script.

Suggested fix: have lease acquire refuse (or require an explicit --adopt flag) when an existing lease at --run-dir currently classifies live, and have partial append take/verify the epoch it expects rather than trusting whatever the lease currently holds.

No other issues found

• validate_run_id (lines 121-133) correctly rejects empty ids, non-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]* shapes, and any .. substring; run-state.test.sh's three mutation-based negative tests genuinely prove each check is load-bearing (deleting either arm demonstrably lets traversal/absolute paths through), closing path traversal for the one caller-supplied input the script treats as untrusted-by-design.
• No eval, source, or command substitution over unsanitized input anywhere in the script; all arguments are consumed as literal argv values.
• partial append's --record is written with a plain printf '%s\n' "$record" >>"$file" — never parsed or evaluated by this script, so a malformed/adversarial value can at most corrupt the JSONL artifact's own readability for a downstream reader (data-integrity concern, not injection or traversal). The '{'* prefix check (line 486-489) is not full JSON validation (Codex's P2 comment is accurate on this), but I'm not raising it as a security finding — it's an availability/robustness concern for --resume parsing, not an authorization, injection, or trust-boundary gap.
• write_lease_atomic's temp file ($dir/.lease.$$) is written under a directory the script itself creates; a symlink race there requires an attacker who already has write access to the same user's plugin-data directory, i.e. the same trust level as the process itself — not a meaningful privilege boundary.
• epoch/stale_after/skew_grace are all validated as non-negative integers via require_positive_int before being written into the lease or used to build the partial's filename — no injection via those fields.
• No secrets, tokens, or credentials are handled anywhere in this diff.
• The doc changes (SKILL.md, both reference/*.md files) only describe invocation of the script and make no new security-relevant claims beyond what the script itself does or doesn't enforce; the "Trust surface" language matches the two gaps above but doesn't introduce new ones.

Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 1m 24s —— View job

Security review

• Gather context (diff, changed files)
• Review run-state.sh for injection/path-traversal/logic/trust-boundary issues
• Review run-state.test.sh for unsafe patterns
• Review doc/reference changes for security-relevant claims
• Cross-check prior automated findings for accuracy at current HEAD
• Post findings

Scope reviewed: plugins/claude-config/skills/audit-pass/scripts/run-state.sh (new), run-state.test.sh (new), and the SKILL.md/reference/*.md diffs describing script invocation, at HEAD 7752f0f. No GitHub Actions/workflow files changed, so zizmor's lanes (unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, excessive permissions:, template injection) don't apply. Verified 7752f0f only changes the executable bit on the two scripts (git show --stat 7752f0f shows 0 insertions, 0 deletions for both files) — the logic is byte-identical to what earlier automated passes reviewed on this PR, so I re-verified those findings directly against the current code rather than assuming they still hold.

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — --run-dir is trusted verbatim by lease * / partial append, unlike paths

cmd_paths validates both path segments it derives — --run-id via validate_run_id (line 121) and --plugin-data for being absolute (line 202) — before assembling run_dir. But cmd_lease_acquire, heartbeat/release/classify, and cmd_partial_append all accept --run-dir as a raw string and never check it falls under <plugin-data>/runs/<state-key>/…. Line 272 unconditionally mkdir -p "$run_dir" and writes a lease file at whatever path it's given.

The script's own header ("SCOPE OF WRITES", lines 28-36) and SKILL.md describe writes as confined to the derived run directory, but that ordering — always pipe paths' output into later commands — is enforced only by the calling skill's prose discipline, not by the script. For a report-only audit skill whose whole premise is processing potentially adversarial/untrusted repository content with Bash/Write still available (disallowed-tools: Edit, NotebookEdit only), a --run-dir that gets redirected (e.g. into the audited repo, or elsewhere under the filesystem) via a confused-deputy or prompt-injection-influenced tool call would be honored silently. Impact is limited (directory creation + small fixed-name text files, no code execution, no credential exposure), so not critical — but it's a real gap between the documented trust boundary and what's mechanically enforced.

Suggested fix: have lease */partial append verify --run-dir is lexically contained under a --plugin-data-rooted runs/ prefix (or take --plugin-data+--run-id and re-derive the path via cmd_paths's own logic) before mkdir -p or writing.

Fix this →

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — lease acquire has no liveness check before overwrite, and partial append binds to whatever epoch is currently on disk, not the epoch the caller holds

cmd_lease_acquire never reads or classifies an existing lease before replacing it (line 272 onward) — it unconditionally overwrites even if classify on the existing lease would currently return live. Meanwhile cmd_partial_append reads owner_epoch from the lease file at append time, not the epoch the caller originally acquired:

epoch=$(lease_field "$run_dir/lease" owner_epoch)
...
file="$run_dir/findings.partial.$epoch.jsonl"

If a second lease acquire is ever issued against a run directory whose lease is still live (concurrent run, run-id collision, or a --resume flow that skips a classify-before-acquire check — a check the script itself doesn't enforce, same "prose orders the calls, code doesn't" gap as the finding above), the lease's owner_epoch silently becomes the new value, and any prior holder still calling partial append will have its records appended into the new writer's partial file — because the epoch is read live from disk rather than carried by the caller. This undermines the documented epoch-isolation guarantee ("the partial cannot exist without the lease that classifies it") by letting two writers' records interleave in one JSONL file without error. This is the same root cause independently flagged by Codex's P1 review comment on line 496.

Exploitability under the documented single acquire → heartbeat/append → release call pattern is narrow (stale-lease adoption / compare-and-set is explicitly out of scope for this PR per the PR description), but the write side of the mutual-exclusion problem has no guard at all, while the read/classify side is carefully double-bound (the two-sided liveness window and its negative tests are solid).

Suggested fix: have lease acquire refuse (or require an explicit adoption flag) when an existing lease at --run-dir currently classifies live, and have partial append take/verify the epoch it expects rather than trusting whatever the lease currently holds on disk.

Fix this →

No other issues found

• validate_run_id (lines 121-133) correctly rejects empty ids, non-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]* shapes, and any .. substring. run-state.test.sh's three mutation-based negative tests genuinely prove each check is load-bearing (deleting a check demonstrably lets traversal/absolute paths through), closing path traversal for the one caller-supplied input the script treats as untrusted-by-design.
• No eval, source, or command substitution over unsanitized input anywhere in the script; all arguments are consumed as literal argv values. Confirmed run-state.test.sh contains no eval/unsafe temp-file handling either — its mktemp -d usage (line 17) is the standard safe pattern.
• partial append's --record is written via a plain printf '%s\n' "$record" >>"$file" (line 501) — never parsed or evaluated by this script, so a malformed/adversarial value can at most corrupt the JSONL artifact's own readability for a downstream reader (data-integrity concern for --resume parsing, not injection or traversal here). The '{'* prefix check (lines 486-489) is not full JSON validation, but that's a robustness gap, not a security boundary.
• write_lease_atomic's temp file ($dir/.lease.$$) is written under a directory the script itself just created; a symlink race there requires an attacker who already has write access to the same user's plugin-data directory — the same trust level as the process itself, not a meaningful privilege boundary.
• epoch/stale_after/skew_grace are all validated as non-negative integers via require_positive_int before being written into the lease or used to build the partial's filename — no injection via those fields.
• No secrets, tokens, or credentials are handled anywhere in this diff.
• The doc changes (SKILL.md, both reference/*.md files) only describe invocation of the script and don't assert any security guarantee the script doesn't itself state — the "writes only under the plugin data directory it is given" framing matches the two gaps above rather than introducing new ones.

Summary: two IMPORTANT, plausible-confidence findings, both about mechanism-vs-prose trust boundaries in run-state.sh (unvalidated --run-dir containment; no compare-and-set on lease acquire, letting partial append's epoch binding be redirected). No CRITICAL findings. No injection, secret-handling, or workflow-permission issues found.

Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 6m 31s —— View job

Code Review (correctness / maintainability lane)

• Gather context (diff, changed files)
• Read repo CLAUDE.md / REVIEW.md for lane scoping and standards
• Review run-state.sh for correctness, error handling, maintainability
• Review run-state.test.sh for test coverage/quality
• Review SKILL.md / reference doc diffs for consistency with the script
• Post inline findings + summary

This repo has a claude-security-review workflow, so per REVIEW.md's lane split this review omits security findings (trust boundary, injection, authz) — those belong to the security lane, which has already posted twice on this PR. This pass covers correctness, design, error handling, and test coverage.

Note on verification: git fetch/bash <script>/shellcheck all required interactive approval that wasn't available in this run, so I could not execute run-state.test.sh or shellcheck myself. The Test plan's pass/fail output in the PR description is the author's own claimed verification, not something I independently confirmed — I reviewed the script and tests by reading, not running them.

Important — the applying lock is unimplemented, and unlike the two clauses this PR does disclose, that's not stated anywhere

§3 specifies two run-state mechanisms: the lease (which this PR implements: lease acquire|heartbeat|release|classify) and a separate exclusive advisory lock an applying (--fix) run takes at runs/<state-key>/lock — containing pid, platform start-identity, a start timestamp, and the run id, with its own 30-minute age-based reclaim logic (reference/run-state-and-resumability.md#L29-L65). run-state.sh has no lock subcommand at all — only paths, lease *, and partial append — so taking, refreshing, reclaiming, or releasing that lock is still entirely a model-discipline operation, exactly the "contract read as enforced when nothing enforces it" defect this PR's whole thesis is about closing.

What makes this worth flagging rather than out-of-scope-and-fine: the PR is careful to name the two things it deliberately leaves unimplemented — stale-lease adoption and §7 assembly — in both the script header and a new "What is executable here, and what is not" paragraph it adds right into this same reference doc (reference/run-state-and-resumability.md#L96-L103). That disclosure paragraph is scoped to "everything below" it — i.e. the lease subsection — and the lock, described just above it in the same §3, gets no equivalent statement anywhere in this diff or pre-existing text. SKILL.md still just says "an applying run takes an exclusive advisory lock and refuses rather than queues" (SKILL.md#L134) with no note that this, too, has no executable behind it.

This is pre-existing (the lock was never implemented before this PR either), so it's not a regression — but this diff is the one that establishes the "declare what you don't implement" norm in this exact section, and the lock is the one adjacent mechanism the norm isn't applied to. Extending the "what is executable here, and what is not" paragraph to cover the lock (or adding a one-line sibling note near SKILL.md's lock-posture paragraph) would close it cheaply and keep the PR's own standard applied consistently.

Two inline findings (test coverage / validation)

• require_positive_int accepts 0 and is reused to validate --epoch, but the lease's documented contract is owner_epoch "starting at 1" — --epoch 0 passes silently. (run-state.sh:267)
• require_positive_int's rejection path (malformed --stale-after/--skew-grace/--epoch) has no test, positive or negative, unlike validate_run_id which is covered by both ordinary and mutation-based negative tests. (run-state.test.sh:136)

No other issues found

• write_lease_atomic's write-then-rename keeps every lease write atomic from a reader's perspective, satisfying REVIEW.md's atomicity check for the one place this script writes a record that other code paths read mid-flight.
• cmd_paths's error path when lib/state-key.sh produces no output is sound: I read lib/state-key.sh directly and confirmed every one of its exit 2 paths happens before its final printf, so cmd_paths's [[ -z "$state_key" ]] check is a real (not just apparent) safety net rather than a race with partial stdout.
• cmd_lease_heartbeat's max(now, previous) guard against a rewound clock, and cmd_lease_classify's two-sided window, are both logically sound and match what run-state.test.sh exercises by reading.
• CHANGELOG and plugin.json version bumps (0.37.2 → 0.38.0) are consistent with each other and with semver for a new-feature addition.
• The default threshold change (300s → 1800s) is consistently applied across the script's DEFAULT_STALE_AFTER_S, SKILL.md, and both reference docs — no stale "5 minutes" reference was missed.
  (branch: fix/2280-audit-pass-run-state)

Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 2m 6s —— View job

Security review

• Gather context (diff, changed files, delta since last review)
• Review run-state.sh for injection/path-traversal/logic/trust-boundary issues
• Review run-state.test.sh for unsafe patterns
• Review doc/reference changes for security-relevant claims
• Check what changed in the newest commit (zero-staleness-window fix) since the last automated pass
• Post findings

Scope reviewed: all 7 files changed in this PR at HEAD 75007bc (plugins/claude-config/skills/audit-pass/scripts/run-state.sh, run-state.test.sh, SKILL.md, both reference/*.md, CHANGELOG.md, .claude-plugin/plugin.json). No workflow/Action files changed, so zizmor's lanes (unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, excessive permissions:, template injection) don't apply.

The newest commit (75007bc, "refuse a zero staleness window") only touches --stale-after/--epoch validation (require_int_at_least_one) and documents --epoch as the adoption seam — it does not change either of the two trust-boundary gaps prior automated passes on this PR already identified, which I re-verified directly against the current code rather than assuming carried forward:

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — --run-dir is trusted verbatim by lease * / partial append, unlike paths

cmd_paths validates both segments it derives — --run-id via validate_run_id (line 132) and --plugin-data for being absolute (line 230) — before assembling run_dir. But cmd_lease_acquire, heartbeat/release/classify, and cmd_partial_append all accept --run-dir as a raw string with no check that it falls under <plugin-data>/runs/<state-key>/…. Line 300 unconditionally mkdir -p "$run_dir" and writes a lease file at whatever path it's given.

The script's own header ("SCOPE OF WRITES", lines 34-42) and SKILL.md ("Do not derive the run directory or hand-write the lease", SKILL.md:140-146) describe writes as confined to the derived run directory, but that ordering — always pipe paths' output into later commands — is enforced only by the calling skill's prose discipline, not by the script. For a report-only audit skill that processes potentially adversarial/untrusted repository content with Bash/Write still available (disallowed-tools: Edit, NotebookEdit only), a --run-dir redirected by a confused-deputy or prompt-injection-influenced tool call would be honored silently. Impact stays limited (directory creation + small fixed-name text files, no code execution, no credential exposure), so not critical — but it's a real, unaddressed gap between the documented trust boundary and what's mechanically enforced.

Suggested fix: have lease */partial append verify --run-dir is lexically contained under a --plugin-data-rooted runs/ prefix (or take --plugin-data+--run-id and re-derive the path via cmd_paths's own logic) before mkdir -p or writing.

IMPORTANT (confidence: plausible) — lease acquire still has no liveness/compare-and-set check; partial append still binds to whatever epoch is on disk, not the epoch the caller holds

This commit documents lease acquire --epoch <n> as "the adoption seam" and states the compare-and-set "is §3's, performed by the run" — but cmd_lease_acquire still never reads or classifies an existing lease before replacing it (line 300 onward unconditionally overwrites, even if classify on the existing lease would currently return live). cmd_partial_append still reads owner_epoch from the lease file at append time, not the epoch the caller originally acquired — so if a second lease acquire (adopting or otherwise) is ever issued against a run directory whose lease is still live, a prior holder's subsequent partial append calls silently land in the new writer's epoch file, interleaving two writers' records in one JSONL artifact. This is the same root cause Codex's P1 comment (line 524) independently flagged, unchanged by this commit.

This is explicitly declared out of scope by the PR description ("Stale-lease adoption... NOT implemented... carried out by the run itself"), and exploitability under the documented single acquire → heartbeat/append → release pattern is narrow (requires a run-id collision or an out-of-order tool call). Flagging again only because the write side of the mutual-exclusion problem still has zero guard while the read/classify side is carefully double-bound — so, as before, the isolation property is only as strong as caller discipline, not the script, and this commit's own header now says so explicitly (line 31: "The compare-and-set that decides who won is §3's, performed by the run") without changing that the script accepts any --epoch value handed to it with no verification against the lease it's replacing.

Suggested fix (if in scope for a follow-up): have lease acquire refuse (absent an explicit adopt path) when an existing lease at --run-dir currently classifies live, and have partial append verify/bind to the epoch the caller expects rather than trusting whatever the lease currently holds on disk.

No new issues from this commit's changes

• require_int_at_least_one (lines 162-168) correctly composes require_non_negative_int with a < 1 check; --skew-grace correctly stays on the non-negative-only path so --skew-grace 0 remains legal. No injection or logic inversion introduced — stale_after/epoch are still only ever used as validated integers in arithmetic (delta=$((now - heartbeat))) or written verbatim into the lease as key=value lines, never interpreted by the shell.
• The two new test blocks in run-state.test.sh (lines 150-169) exercise the refusal paths with the same safe mktemp -d / subshell pattern as the rest of the file — no eval, no unsafe temp-file handling.
• Doc changes (CHANGELOG.md, reference/run-state-and-resumability.md) only describe the new refusal and the --epoch adoption seam; they don't assert any security guarantee beyond what the script does, and don't overstate --epoch's protection (the surrounding prose is explicit that the CAS itself isn't implemented here).

Carried-forward from prior passes, still holding at this HEAD:

• validate_run_id (lines 132-144) correctly rejects empty ids, non-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]* shapes, and any .. substring, with load-bearing mutation-based negative tests. Path traversal via --run-id remains closed.
• No eval, source, or command substitution over unsanitized input anywhere in the script.
• partial append's --record is a plain printf '%s\n' "$record" >>"$file" — never parsed/evaluated, so a malformed value corrupts JSONL readability for a downstream reader at worst, not a security boundary.
• write_lease_atomic's temp file ($dir/.lease.$$) is written under a directory the script just created — a symlink race there needs the same trust level as the process itself.
• No secrets, tokens, or credentials handled anywhere in this diff.

Summary: two IMPORTANT, plausible-confidence findings, both unchanged mechanism-vs-prose trust-boundary gaps (unvalidated --run-dir containment; no compare-and-set on lease acquire, letting partial append's epoch binding be redirected). No CRITICAL findings and nothing newly introduced by the latest commit. No injection, secret-handling, or workflow-permission issues found.

Claude has reviewed this PR 2 times. The lane skips further automatic reviews after 5; deleting this comment resets the count.

Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 6m 13s —— View job

Code review

• Gather context (diff, changed files, CLAUDE.md/REVIEW.md guidelines)
• Review run-state.sh for correctness, error handling, maintainability
• Review run-state.test.sh for test coverage/quality
• Review SKILL.md and reference doc changes for consistency
• Cross-check existing bot findings (Cursor/Codex/security lane) to avoid duplicating security scope
• Post findings

Scope. This repo runs a dedicated security lane (.github/workflows/claude-security-review.yml), so per REVIEW.md this lane owns correctness, design, error handling, tests, and documentation, and leaves security to that lane. The --run-dir containment gap and the lease acquire/epoch compare-and-set gap already flagged by Cursor, the security-review bot, and Codex are security-scope findings — not repeated here.

Posted 3 inline findings on this pass, all correctness/design/test-coverage, none security:

1. 🔴 Important — SKILL.md:145: the canonical paths invocation omits --root, so the state key falls back to the Bash tool's ambient cwd instead of the target root Phase 0 just resolved — in tension with this same file's own "never the working directory" invariant (lines 56-58), and the one invocation shape run-state.test.sh never actually exercises (every test call passes --root).
2. 🟡 Nit — run-state.sh:352: cmd_lease_heartbeat's clock-rewind guard pins heartbeat_at to the old value but always stamps heartbeat_at_iso with the current time, so the two fields can describe different instants on disk after a rewind. No functional impact (classify only reads the numeric field), but it's exactly the class of bug the 3x-duplicated lease-body construction (lines 305, 354, 396) invites — a shared write_lease helper would remove it structurally.
3. 🟡 Nit — run-state.test.sh:51: CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is pinned in every test invocation, so cmd_paths's environment-fallback path derivation (run-state.sh:238) has zero coverage anywhere in the suite.

Everything else checked, no issues:

• Version bump (0.37.2 → 0.38.0) and CHANGELOG entry are consistent with a new executable surface (minor, not patch), and the documented defaults (stale_after_s=1800, skew_grace_s=60) match the code exactly.
• usage() text, the command dispatch table, and exit-code contract (0 for a classification, 2 for usage/validation errors) all match actual behavior.
• The three negative tests (.. rejection, segment-shape rejection, lower-bound skew rejection) each self-verify their sed target still matches before trusting the mutated copy — confirmed each target string (e.g. "must not contain") is unique in run-state.sh, so the mutation touches only the intended line.
• Atomicity (REVIEW.md's always-check item): the lease is replaced via temp-file + mv -f (write_lease_atomic), so a reader never observes a half-written lease and a crash mid-write leaves the prior lease intact.
• Doc cross-references between SKILL.md, both reference/*.md files, and the script's own header comments are internally consistent (same defaults, same "script enforces X, run enforces Y" split stated in each place it's relevant).

Note: I did not independently run run-state.test.sh, shellcheck, or the repo's portability/changelog gates myself — the Test Plan's "52 checks passed" and gate output in the PR description is the author's own claimed verification, not something I confirmed with a tool.
· branch fix/2280-audit-pass-run-state